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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are accurately set forth in the majority opinion of the Court
and need not be restated here.
ARGUMENT
POINT!
'

•

'

•

•

'

•

•

.

'

•

THE COURT CORRECTLY CONSTRUED 41-6-166, U.C.A.,
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT,
The clear and unequivocal language of the statute as simply stated by the
majority opinion of the Court provides that "If a person is arrested for drunk driving by a
peace officer, or anyone else, he should be immediately taken before a magistrate who

-2has jurisdiction of such offense and is nearest to the place where such arrest is made."
The obvious legislative intent of such a statute is to provide a means whereby persons
charged with "driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor", or "hit and run",
would be afforded special procedures; otherwise, the legislature would not have
delineated these special instances. Argument has been made by the respondent that
there is a conflict between the procedures set forth in the traffic section of the Utah
Code and the applicable criminal trialprocedural statutes, such as 77-13-17, U . C . A .
41-6-166, U . C . A . , prescribes the procedure to be followed by the arresting officer
where a person is arrested without warrant for alleged "driving under the influence of
intoxicating liquor", or "hit and run", and is certainly not intended to dictate the place
of trial or determine finally who has exclusive jurisdiction.
As suggested by the majority of the Court, compliance with the provisions
of 41-6-166 could have been accomplished by the state producing evidence that the
nearest and most accessible magistrate was not available.

Moreover, had such a showing

been made by the respondent, the accused could have been taken to the Logan City Court,
or another available magistrate. Absent such a showing, procedural due process, as
provided by the statutes, has not been afforded the defendant.

The Supreme Court's

decision is in conformity with the general rule of law as stated in 6 C . J„SW Arrest,
Section 17(b):
" The officer or private person who made the arrest
must produce the person arrested before the proper
authority within a reasonable time."
\'
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"Statutes usually provide for taking . . .
before a magistrate, and designate what
magistrate. Such statufes are mandatory."

P O I N T II

-

- •

THE RULING OF THE COURT DOES N O T DICTATE
THE PLACE OR M A N N E R O F THE TRIAL.
Respondent makes the argument that the Utah statutes provide separate
and distinct procedures for handling criminal complaints and that the states prosecutor
should have an election as to which procedure should be taken and that a defendant
should not complain. We feel that such an argument has no application to the matter
before the Court.

41-6-166, U . C . A . , as previously stated, outlines procedures to be

followed by arresting officers under the traffic code.

77-13-17, U . C . A . , sets forth the

procedures to be followed by an arresting officer without warrant in general misdemeanor
situations.

Neither type of procedural statute dictates, in any manner, how or where

the case should be prosecuted. Sections 41-6-167 and 41-6-169 of the Utah Code give
further directions as to how the arrested person shall be advised by the officer and
magistrate after arrest, where the arrest is made without a warrant.
between the traffic code and the criminal code.

There is no conflict

The arresting officer need merely to

follow the directions provided in the traffic code when the arrest is made without warrant,
and the directions made under the criminal code when the arrest is made with warrant.
Indeed, we feel that the argument made by the respondent is specious and has no applicati.
o the matter before the Court*
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POINTIII
RESPONDENT ARGUES THAT I N MAKING ITS
DECISION, THE COURT FAILED TO DETERMINE AS TO
WHETHER OR NOT COMPLIANCE WlTH SECTION 41-6-166
U . C . A . , CONFERS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION UPON
THE MAGISTRATE BEFORE WHOM A N APPEARANCE IS
MADE FOR THE MATTERS OF TRIAL.
A plain and simple reading of fhe decision indicates that the Court is
concerned with procedural due process and that failure to comply with 41-6-166, U . C . A . ,
ii

amounts to lack thereof. After the arrest has been properly made in compliance with
Section 41-6-166, U . C . A . , it is clear that the trial may be had before any magistrate
having jurisdiction of such an offense, which, in this case, would include any justice
or city court within the County. See Dillard vs. District Court of Salt Lake County (1926)
69 U. 10, 251 Pac. 1070, and 78-5-4, U . C . A . , 1953. Subsequent to the time of arrest,
there certainly may be plea bargaining, motions for change of venue, forum non-convenience,
etc., or a change of venue by stipulation. The decision of the Court as promulgated by the
majority holds plain and simply that the defendant has not been afforded procedural due
process as provided in the traffic code statute previously cited. Whether or not failure
to comply with 41-6-166, U . C . A . , prevents further prosecution is a question which must
be decided after the defendant has been properly charged, which has not yet been
accomplished, even though the issue was brought to the attention of the Court at an early
stage of the proceedings.
Respondent, in his brief, recites many ogres and complications which
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respondent feels will result by the application of the majority opinion.

Considered

in its simplest terms, the case involves procedural due process, particularly the procedure.
which must be afforded the accused when arrested for allegedly, "driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquors", or "hit and run", under Title 4 1 , U . C . A .

When

the defendant appeared specially in the case before the Court and raised the issue, the
Court could have solved the matter simply by dismissing the charges against the defendant,
and the prosecutor could have issued a complaint before the proper magistrate.
case could then have proceeded in the normal manner upon its merits.

The

Indeed,

"unreasonable delay", and all of the other ogres raised by the respondent have no
relevance to the issues before the Court, and have been caused by the State, notthe
defendant.
CONCLUSION
Respondent states in his brief that the decision before the Court fails to
give direction to arresting peace officers who have to deal with defendants charged with
"driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor", "hit and run", etc.

On the contrary,

we feel that a citizen is entitled to rely on the arresting officer and that a citizen should
have confidence that the clearly-defined legislative directions, especially in serious
:riminal matters which may deprive a citizen of his freedom and property, should be
trictly followed by officers and the Courts. When the statute selects two specific crimes
md prescribes special procedures which must be followed, the legislative mandate demands
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Respectfully submitted,

V Choi-
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